“DMARC Quarantine/Reject policy not enabled”, often shortened to “DMARC Policy Not Enabled”, means your domain has a DMARC record, but it is set to p=none, so it asks receivers to do nothing with email that fails. The fix is to move to p=quarantine and then p=reject, once your DMARC reports show that every service sending as you passes.

MXToolbox and many security scanners show this warning. Switching straight to p=reject would clear it, but it can also block your own invoices and password resets, so the steps below go in the safe order.

What the warning means

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) is a TXT record at _dmarc.example.com. Its most important part is the policy tag, p=, which has three possible values. They are defined in RFC 9989, the current DMARC standard, which replaced the original RFC 7489 in May 2026:

  • p=none: the domain owner expresses no preference. RFC 7489 put it as requesting “no specific action” on mail that fails.
  • p=quarantine: mail that fails should be treated as suspicious, usually by putting it in the spam or junk folder.
  • p=reject: mail that fails should be refused.

“DMARC policy not enabled” means your record says p=none. MXToolbox’s own explanation is that the record “is not currently protected against phishing and spoofing threats”, and that the fix is to “set a Quarantine or Reject policy on the domain’s DMARC record.” It also advises not to do that “until you have evaluated your DMARC reports”. Both parts are right: evaluate the reports first, then set the policy. The rest of this post is about doing that safely.

Other ways this warning appears

The same finding goes by other names. MXToolbox’s own help page for it shows the result line as “No DMARC Protection”. Its BIMI check reports “BIMI DMARC Policy Not Enabled” for the same record because, in MXToolbox’s words, a BIMI logo needs “a DMARC record published that contains a p tag with the value quarantine or reject.” Our post on BIMI for small businesses covers that side.

A record can also look enforced and still act like p=none, or leave part of your domain open. Four details in the DMARC standard cause this:

  • A test flag. t=y asks receivers to apply the policy one level lower, so p=quarantine; t=y is handled as p=none, and p=reject; t=y as p=quarantine.
  • A policy receivers cannot read. If the p tag is missing, or its value is not none, quarantine or reject (a typo such as p=rejct), receivers act as if the record said p=none, provided it has a valid rua address. Without one, they apply no DMARC at all.
  • Open subdomains. sp=none keeps existing subdomains at none, and np=none does the same for subdomain names that do not exist, even when p=reject. RFC 9989 calls a domain enforced only when neither it nor any subdomain below it is at p=none.
  • A pct value below 100. Older records may carry it. Under RFC 7489, only that share of failing mail got the stated policy. RFC 9989 dropped the tag, noting that values other than 0 and 100 were “usually not accurately applied”. If you meant testing, use t=y. If not, remove pct.

Our free check flags pct below 100 and sp=none. For t=y and np, read the record yourself.

Why p=none is not protection

DMARC exists to stop other people from sending email that pretends to come from your domain. With p=none, you have told every receiving server that you do not want anything done about those messages.

Microsoft documents what Microsoft 365 does with inbound mail that fails DMARC, by sender policy:

Sender’s policy What Microsoft 365 does with mail that fails DMARC
p=none No DMARC-specific action. Other filtering still applies.
p=quarantine Delivers it to the Junk Email folder (the admin can choose quarantine instead).
p=reject Rejects it during delivery.

That table assumes the receiving organization keeps Microsoft’s “Honor DMARC record policy” setting on, which Microsoft recommends.

So with p=none, a fake invoice sent “from” your domain to your customer is judged only by the receiver’s general spam filters. Whether they catch it has nothing to do with your DMARC record.

Microsoft tells its own customers that “The goal is to get to a p=reject DMARC policy for all of your custom domains and subdomains.”

So why does anyone use p=none?

Because it is the right first step, as long as it is not the last one. p=none is monitoring mode. Microsoft describes it as the value you use “for testing and tuning of the DMARC policy.”

While your record is at p=none and includes a reporting address (rua=), receivers such as Gmail and Outlook send you daily aggregate reports. Each report lists the servers that sent mail using your domain, how many messages each sent, and whether they passed SPF and DKIM. That is how you find every legitimate service before you switch on enforcement.

It also meets the minimum for bulk senders: Google’s sender guidelines, which apply to senders of more than 5,000 messages a day to Gmail accounts, say the DMARC policy “can be set to none.”

The problem is that many domains publish p=none and never come back. There is no reporting address, or the reports land in a mailbox nobody reads. The scanner warning is a reminder that the job is half done.

Why not just switch to p=reject today?

Because you might block your own email. Most small businesses send mail from more places than they think:

Each of these has to pass DMARC on its own. A message passes DMARC when SPF or DKIM passes and the domain they checked matches the domain in the From address. This matching is called alignment. A service can pass SPF for its own domain and still fail DMARC for yours, because the domains do not match.

If you switch to p=reject before every one of those services is aligned, receivers that honor DMARC will start refusing your invoices or password resets.

Seen it in a security report or insurance questionnaire?

Then someone has read the same public record. Anyone can look up a domain’s DMARC policy with one DNS query, so scanners, vendor reviews and insurers can check it without asking you.

The bar in public guidance is enforcement, and the end point is p=reject:

  • The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) required federal agencies, in Binding Operational Directive 18-01, to set “a DMARC policy of ‘reject’ for all second-level domains and mail-sending hosts” by October 2018.
  • The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) says: “Having a DMARC policy of ‘reject’ on all of your domains is the best way to prevent spoofing of your email.”
  • RFC 9989 defines enforcement as any policy other than p=none, for the domain and every subdomain below it.

Answer from the record as it is today. If the question is whether you have DMARC, p=none means yes. If it asks whether DMARC is enforced, or set to quarantine or reject, p=none means no. If you are part-way through the move, say so, and give the current policy and the date you expect to reach p=reject.

Do not switch to p=reject overnight to tick the box. The risk to your own invoices and password resets described above does not change because a form asked.

How to fix it safely

1. Make sure reports are arriving

Check that your DMARC record has a rua=mailto: address and that the mailbox exists. A safe starter record looks like this, with your own domain in place of example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com; fo=1

If you have no reporting address at all, add one and wait for reports before going further. If you have no DMARC record yet, see no DMARC record found.

2. List every service that sends as you

Read the reports for at least two weeks. Group the sending servers by service. Anything you recognize goes on the “ours” list. Anything you do not recognize is either a forgotten tool or someone spoofing you.

3. Make each legitimate service pass with your domain

For each service on the “ours” list:

  • Turn on DKIM signing with your own domain. Most providers call this custom DKIM or domain authentication. DKIM survives forwarding better than SPF, so it is the more reliable of the two.
  • Add the service to SPF only if it uses your domain as its bounce address, and keep the SPF record under its limit of 10 DNS lookups. Our post on SPF lookup limits explains how to count.

4. Move to p=quarantine and watch

When your legitimate mail passes consistently, change p=none to p=quarantine. Keep reading reports. If a forgotten service appears and fails, its mail now lands in spam rather than bouncing, which gives you time to fix it.

Older guides, including Microsoft’s, suggest raising enforcement gradually with the pct tag (for example 10, 25, 50, 75, then 100 percent). The current DMARC standard has dropped pct. Our post on choosing between quarantine and reject explains what replaced it and how long to wait at each stage.

5. Move to p=reject

When quarantine has run cleanly, change the policy to p=reject. Keep the reporting address in the record.

Do not forget your other domains

If you own domains that never send email, such as old brand names or typo domains, you can skip monitoring for those. Microsoft recommends this DMARC record for parked domains:

v=DMARC1; p=reject;

Pair it with an SPF record of v=spf1 -all, which says no server may send mail for that domain.

Check where you stand

Run the free DMARC policy check on your own domain. It shows your current DMARC policy, whether reports are configured, and the SPF and DKIM status that decides whether enforcement is safe.

Our DMARC setup service takes a domain from p=none to p=reject for a one-time fee, reads every report for you, and refunds you in full, under our refund conditions, if the domain is not at p=reject within 60 days.

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